The Defenders of Bataan and Corregidor: Priced by the Day, the Slave Labor Struck from the Bill
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The men who held Bataan and Corregidor in the first months of 1942 did so on short rations, short ammunition, and a pre-war plan whose own logic had already written them off — and they knew it; they called themselves, in a line their own press officer put in print at the time, "the Battling Bastards of Bataan — no mama, no papa, no Uncle Sam." They bought the Pacific war its first months with their starvation. Then came the surrender, the Death March, and as much as three and a half years of prisoner-of-war slave labor in mines, mills, and dockyards across Japan's empire. The settlement that followed priced that captivity by the day — and expressly left the slave labor out of the price. Japan's liability, the courts held, expired in 1952. And when Congress finally drafted the correction in the year 2000 — a $20,000 gratuity, payable to the veteran or to his surviving spouse, on findings that concede in plain words that these men "have not been fully compensated" — the bill was introduced, referred to committee, and never enacted. Neither were its successors. This page is the documented record.
The service, and the promise
The defenders were the United States Army Forces in the Far East — regulars, National Guardsmen, Army Air Corps men fighting as infantry, Navy and Marine contingents, and the Philippine forces under American command — who fell back into the Bataan peninsula and the fortress island of Corregidor when the Japanese invasion of December 1941 overwhelmed Luzon. The fallback was not improvisation: it was War Plan Orange, the pre-war plan for a war with Japan, which contemplated exactly this — a withdrawal to Bataan to hold the entrance to Manila Bay while the Pacific Fleet fought its way across the ocean to relieve them. The fleet that was supposed to come had been crippled at Pearl Harbor in the war’s first hours. The plan’s premise was void; the plan was executed anyway, and the men on Bataan lived inside the difference.
In their own documented position — maintained ever since by their organization, the American Defenders of Bataan and Corregidor, and set out in the published analysis of its past national commander Jackfert — the defenders were a sacrifice force: ordered to hold, at starvation rations, against an enemy with air and naval supremacy, in a position the strategy of the time had already abandoned. That characterization is theirs, and this page attributes it to them as the brief of record — but the material facts underneath it are not in dispute: from December 1941 to April 1942, in Congress’s own finding, they “fought valiantly against overwhelming Japanese military forces on the Bataan peninsula… thereby preventing Japan from accomplishing strategic objectives necessary for early military victory in the Pacific.”
Congress’s finding (1) states what they accomplished. Finding (2) states what it cost to begin with: after the surrender order of April 9, 1942, the men of Bataan were “forced to march 85 miles from the Bataan peninsula to a prisoner of war camp at former Camp O’Donnell,” a march Congress’s finding records as resulting in mass death “by reason of starvation, disease, and executions.” Corregidor held until May 6, 1942; its garrison joined the Bataan men at the Cabanatuan camp. The captivity that followed lasted, for those who lived through it, up to three and a half years.
What happened
The captivity was not imprisonment in any ordinary sense. It was labor. Congress’s findings in H.R. 5639 itemize the system in the flat language of a bill:
- “In autumn 1944, Japanese authorities ordered more than 1,600 United States personnel who were prisoners of war at the Cabanatuan camp to provide slave labor in support of the war effort in Japan.” (Finding 4.)
- “Many of the United States personnel who were prisoners of war were transferred to Japan on unmarked vessels, some of which were attacked and sunk by United States military aircraft.” (Finding 5.) — the hell ships, on which American prisoners died uncounted by American bombs and torpedoes because Japan did not mark the ships.
- The units that served at Bataan, the findings note, received three Presidential Unit Citations and the Philippine Presidential Unit Citation. (Finding 6.) The men received the slave labor.
The purpose clause of the same bill states the summary the men had been stating for fifty-five years by then: the bill exists “to recognize the heroic contributions of the members of the Armed Forces who served in the Philippines at Bataan and Corregidor during World War II, were required to perform slave labor by the Government of Japan to support the war effort of Japan during that war, and have not been fully compensated for their contributions to and sacrifices for United States victory in that war.”
“Have not been fully compensated” is Congress’s own phrase. The sections that follow show, from the same documents, exactly how the under-compensation was constructed — and why it has never been repaired.
What the institution did afterward
The postwar settlement was built in two moves, both documented.
The first move was the treaty. Under the Treaty of Peace with Japan, signed at San Francisco in 1951, the Allied powers waived their nationals’ claims against Japan arising from the war — article 14(b) has been construed to waive the prisoners’ claims for their treatment and their labor. The claims were settled instead out of frozen Japanese assets, through the War Claims Commission, at a rate the successor bills state plainly: $2.50 per day of imprisonment. And the rate had a boundary written into it. Finding (7) of H.R. 5639: “The amount of reparations paid to members of the Armed Forces held as prisoner of war by Japan during World War II were based on time served as prisoner of war, but did not take into account slave labor performed while prisoner of war.” A man was paid for the days he was held. He was not paid for the work he was forced to do while he was held. The settlement priced the calendar and struck the labor from the account.
The second move was closure. Finding (8): “The Government of Japan has concluded through judicial proceedings that liability for compensation payments expired in 1952.” Japanese corporations that had used the prisoners’ labor admitted no liability; the treaty waiver barred the courthouse door; and the American government’s position, for five decades, was that the matter was settled.
Congress’s own findings contain the standing rebuke to that position, in Finding (9): the Government of Canada authorized compensation to its own veterans who had performed slave labor for Japan in the same war and had not been compensated for it. An allied government, presented with the same facts, paid. The United States drafted a bill.
The bill was H.R. 5639, introduced by Representative David Minge on December 4, 2000 and referred to the Committee on Veterans’ Affairs. It authorized the Secretary of Veterans Affairs to pay a gratuity of $20,000 to each covered veteran — or, the bill’s title and text specify, to the surviving spouse of one. It was never enacted. Successor bills followed the same course: H.R. 2835 in the 107th Congress (2001), S. 3811 in the 109th (2006), each with findings reciting the same slave labor, the same $2.50 a day, the same inadequacy — and each dying without a vote into law.
Where it stands now
The gratuity has never been paid. The findings have never been answered on their merits; they have simply been re-introduced, Congress after Congress, into committees, as the population they describe has dwindled from thousands of old men to a handful and then, functionally, to their widows — the very payees the bills named because their drafters understood that by the time the money moved, if it ever moved, it would be wives and widows who received it. The wives had waited out the POW years at home on allotments and rumors; the widows of the march and the camps had waited since 1942. The $20,000 was written for them as much as for the men, and it reached neither.
What the defenders received instead was commemoration: unit citations on paper, observances, the name of the march kept in the language. The American Defenders of Bataan and Corregidor kept their accounting separately — the abandonment thesis in their past national commander’s analysis, the demand for the unpaid labor claim pressed through their organization for the rest of the men’s lives. Their position is on this page attributed to them, as the record requires. But the central fact of this page is not theirs; it is Congress’s. It is written in a bill the United States House of Representatives received in December 2000 and never passed: these men “have not been fully compensated.” The bill said it. The bill died. Both halves of that sentence are the record.
The ledger
The accounting, in three lines — what the record shows has been done, what it shows has not, and what is still being sought.
What has been done
- The holding of Bataan and Corregidor, December 1941 to April and May 1942, which Congress’s findings credit with preventing Japan from accomplishing strategic objectives necessary for early victory in the Pacific — recognized with three Presidential Unit Citations and the Philippine Presidential Unit Citation for the units.
- Postwar payment at $2.50 per day of imprisonment, from frozen Japanese assets — compensation for the days of captivity, computed on time held.
- Congress’s findings themselves, entered repeatedly from 2000 forward: that the reparations “did not take into account slave labor,” that Japan’s liability was held to have expired in 1952, and that the defenders “have not been fully compensated.”
What has not been done
- The slave labor has never been compensated — not by Japan, whose liability the treaty waived and whose courts held it expired in 1952, and not by the United States, which priced only the days.
- The correction has never been enacted. H.R. 5639 (2000), proposing a $20,000 gratuity to each veteran or surviving spouse, died in committee; H.R. 2835 (2001) and S. 3811 (2006) followed it. Canada, facing the same facts with its own veterans, paid.
What is being sought
- What the defenders’ organization sought for the men’s lifetimes: acknowledgment in the only coin the settlement left unpaid — compensation for the labor itself, to the veterans or to the surviving spouses the bills named as payees. The bills are unpassed; the finding that the men “have not been fully compensated” stands unrebutted in the congressional record, and unpaid in fact.
Sources
- H.R. 5639, 106th Congress (introduced December 4, 2000) — full text: the nine findings, including the 85-mile march (finding 2), the 1,600 ordered to slave labor in autumn 1944 (finding 4), the unmarked vessels (finding 5), reparations “based on time served… but did not take into account slave labor” (finding 7), Japanese liability “expired in 1952” (finding 8), Canada’s compensation of its own veterans (finding 9), the purpose clause (“have not been fully compensated”), and the $20,000 gratuity payable to a covered veteran or surviving spouse: https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/BILLS-106hr5639ih/html/BILLS-106hr5639ih.htm
- Mansell.com, the Jackfert analysis — the American Defenders of Bataan and Corregidor’s own accounting of the abandonment and the unpaid slave-labor claim, by the organization’s past national commander: https://www.mansell.com
- H.R. 2835, 107th Congress (2001), and S. 3811, 109th Congress (2006) — the successor compensation bills, whose findings state the $2.50-per-day postwar payment and that it “does not begin to fully compensate” the prisoners for the slave labor endured; neither enacted.
Part of Betrayed, Not Forgotten — this site's accounting for the service members and veterans their own institutions failed.