IN MEMORY OF THOMAS ALAN BOWMAN SR. U.S. Navy Veteran He was promised. They never delivered. His story →
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Charles R. Ingram III: The Navy Chief Who Waited Nearly a Year for Care That Never Came

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Charles R. Ingram III served his country in the Navy and came home to a second, quieter obligation — the one the Department of Veterans Affairs owed him. For nearly a year before his death, the VA's own inspector general found, he had no mental-health appointment and no medication, his canceled appointments were never followed up, and care the VA had already approved for him in the community was never scheduled. On March 19, 2016, he died outside the clinic that had left him waiting. This page is the documented record of what the institution's own investigation found, in dates, findings, and the inspector general's own words.

The service, and the promise

Charles R. Ingram III served in the U.S. Navy from 1985 to 1992 and rose to Chief Petty Officer. He was a veteran of the Gulf War era, and the Associated Press identified him plainly as a Gulf War veteran. He lived in Egg Harbor Township, New Jersey.

His record as a VA patient was long, and it was a record of a man who kept asking the system for help. According to the history reproduced in the VA Office of Inspector General (OIG) report, he had received VA health care intermittently at several VA hospitals since 1997, for a variety of medical conditions, including obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) and a particular neurodevelopmental disorder. His first VA mental-health treatment began with management of his OCD in 2000, when he reported two years of prior treatment by a non-VA therapist and psychiatrist and was taking fluvoxamine — Luvox.

The treatment, when he received it, helped. In 2005, the OIG record shows, he was doing well and performing better at work, with reduced compulsiveness, and he attributed the improvement to the medication. At his next psychiatry visit, in February 2008, he reported that he had run out of his medication and was experiencing increased OCD symptoms contributing to problems at work. For the remainder of 2008, he reported taking his medication and having fewer symptoms. The pattern in his own chart was not subtle: on medication and in treatment, he did better; without them, he did worse.

The promise made to a veteran like Charles Ingram is not complicated either. The VA’s mental-health system has procedures — the OIG would later recite them — for following up when a clinic cancels an appointment, when a patient does not show, and when care in the community has been approved, and for reaching out to re-engage a patient in therapy. Those procedures existed. The question his case poses is not whether the VA had rules. It is what happened when a chief petty officer in its care since 1997 needed those rules followed.

What happened

In mid-2011, after a period of stressful life events, Ingram had a mental-health initial assessment at the VA and began psychotherapy. He denied active suicidal thoughts in that session, though he stated he had experienced suicidal ideation in the past, with no history of a suicide attempt. He continued in individual therapy until early 2013.

The clinical notes from that period, quoted in the OIG report, describe a man whose condition was pressing on every part of his life. In 2012, his therapist noted negative thought patterns he attributed to his OCD, difficulty maintaining personal relationships and employment, and a dysphoric mood — a mood of unhappiness — and recorded that while he denied suicidal and homicidal ideation, he admitted to feeling hopeless at times. In early 2013, a psychiatrist started him on sertraline — Zoloft. Late that year he reported that a non-VA therapist was helping with his OCD, that he was sleeping better and calmer, and that his OCD had been worse after stopping his medication and better after restarting it.

In mid-2014, he gave his psychiatrist a written outline of his work history — dates, employers, and reasons for being terminated. The psychiatrist read that long list of jobs as evidence, in the words the OIG quoted, of “a long extensive pattern of severe work impairment that is caused directly by his obsessive compulsive disorder despite being [on] multiple medications and [seeing a] therapist.” A VA psychologist who assessed him a month later recorded a diagnosis of OCD and added the neurodevelopmental disorder, citing his difficulties in social situations and rigid thinking patterns.

In early 2015, the psychologist saw him three times, in 50-minute individual therapy visits. At each visit he denied suicidal and homicidal thoughts, plans, or ideation, and reported stress and frustration about financial and employment issues. His prognosis was documented as fair at two visits and guarded at the next. Also in early 2015, he and his wife attended a 50-minute marital therapy appointment at the mental-health clinic.

A specialist in his neurodevelopmental disorder was not available at the facility. In early 2015, his psychologist requested and received authorization for him to have several outpatient non-VA visits for that condition. The care had been approved. It was never delivered. The non-VA provider told investigators that Ingram had not been seen, despite the provider’s attempts to schedule an appointment with him and telephone calls to the VA facility on more than one occasion. The OIG’s own summary is stark on what followed: no other mental-health visits occurred in 2015 or 2016.

The clinic he used was the VA’s Atlantic County Community Based Outpatient Clinic in Northfield, New Jersey — the Northfield VA — a location that had opened in 2011. The Disabled Veterans summary of the OIG report notes that he had reportedly waited longer than one month for appointments regularly since 2011, and that before his death he had not been seen for more than a year after repeated cancellations for which follow-up attempts were never made.

Staff canceled his appointment in fall 2015, and it was never rescheduled. In late 2015, he walked into the mental-health clinic himself to request an appointment with his therapist. The Associated Press account of the OIG report describes what happened next: his psychologist assessed him in the waiting room, determined he was not in distress, and sent him to the front desk to make an appointment. The date he was given was more than three months away.

While he waited for that date, his life was coming apart in the ways his chart had long predicted. The report recorded that he had lost his job and that his marriage was deteriorating; the Associated Press summarized it as a man who had lost his job and was on the verge of a divorce. He went, in the inspector general’s finding, almost a year without seeing a counselor or taking medications for his mental-health problems.

On Saturday, March 19, 2016, Charles Ingram, age 51, went to the Northfield clinic. The clinic was closed at the time. Outside it, he doused himself with gasoline and set himself on fire. He was taken by helicopter to Temple University Hospital in Philadelphia, where he died hours later, with burns of 100 percent. He died, the Associated Press noted, shortly before the appointment date he had been given.

He left a wife and two young children, ages 3 and 5.

What the institution did afterward

The VA Office of Inspector General investigated, and in November 2017 it issued its report. The Associated Press reported its release on November 17, 2017; the Disabled Veterans summary, which reproduced the report’s clinical history at length, tallied 11 health care failures linked to his death:

The summary’s tally of the individual failures runs the whole chain: no timely appointment; overbooking instructions not followed; no follow-up after clinic cancellations or patient no-shows; no follow-up appointments; no medication refills; the lack of appointments neither documented nor acknowledged; no outreach to a veteran in distress; community care never scheduled; clinic processes unsupervised. In the inspector general’s own conclusion, the failures “led to a lack of ordered (mental health) therapy and necessary medications… and may have contributed to his distress.”

The OIG also stated, plainly, the limit of its finding: “We were unable to determine whether addressing these issues during the course of treatment would have resulted in a different outcome for the patient.”

The VA did not dispute the picture. VA spokesman David Cowgill said the report highlighted “unacceptable problems” that the agency was addressing by replacing the clinic’s director; establishing same-day services for urgent mental-health cases; hiring additional staff; and prioritizing suicide prevention. U.S. Sen. Cory Booker of New Jersey said the report “makes clear that important policies and procedures weren’t followed in the lead-up to Charles Ingram’s death last year,” and that his death “was a tragedy that shook us to the core.” Booker, Sen. Bob Menendez, and Rep. Frank LoBiondo all acknowledged improvements made at the clinic since his death, including new leadership in the Delaware office that oversaw the New Jersey clinic and the hiring of additional staff.

Every one of those remedies — the replaced director, the same-day urgent mental-health services, the new hires, the new oversight leadership — was implemented after Charles Ingram died. Ingram’s mother and sister declined to comment on the report.

Where it stands now

The documented record in the sources for this page ends where the inspector general left it, in November 2017, and this page will not pretend otherwise. As of that record, the OIG’s findings stood unrebutted by the agency — its own spokesman called the problems “unacceptable” — and the remedies listed above had been put in place at the clinic and in the Delaware office overseeing it.

What the record does not contain is any finding that following the VA’s own procedures would have saved him — the inspector general expressly said it could not determine that — and it contains no later accounting, in these sources, of whether the follow-up procedures whose absence the OIG catalogued are now followed for the next veteran at that clinic whose appointment is canceled, who does not show, or whose approved community care is waiting to be scheduled.

What remains, in the record, is the sequence itself, and it is why his name is on this wall. A chief petty officer in VA care since 1997 went nearly a year with neither a counselor nor medication, while the follow-ups the VA required of itself were not made, not documented, and not supervised — and the appointment he finally received, after walking in and asking, was set more than three months away, on a date he did not live to reach.

The ledger

The accounting, in three lines — what the record shows has been done, what it shows has not, and what is still being sought.

What has been done

What has not been done

What is being sought


Sources

Part of Betrayed, Not Forgotten — this site's accounting for the service members and veterans their own institutions failed.

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