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The Fitzgerald and McCain Seventeen: Crews the Navy's Own Reviews Called Exhausted and Undertrained, in Collisions the Navy Called Avoidable

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Two American destroyers, two merchant ships, two flooded berthing compartments, sixty-four days apart. Seven sailors died on USS Fitzgerald on June 17, 2017. Ten died on USS John S. McCain on August 21, 2017. The Navy's own Chief of Naval Operations said publicly that both collisions were avoidable. Its comprehensive review counted failure upon failure in planning, watchstanding, training, and readiness. Its second, secret investigation of Fitzgerald documented a warship sent to sea without a quartermaster chief for two years, with navigation equipment broken and cannibalized for parts. Then the criminal cases against the two commanding officers collapsed — the homicide charges dropped, the remaining Fitzgerald charges dismissed — and the institution substituted letters of censure, briefed seventeen families on findings the public was not allowed to read, and moved on. This page is the record of both halves of that story.

The service, and the promise

The seven sailors killed aboard USS Fitzgerald were:

The ten sailors killed aboard USS John S. McCain were:

Both ships were Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyers of the Seventh Fleet, forward-deployed to Japan — the most heavily tasked fleet in the Navy. The promise made to sailors in berthing compartments below the waterline is the oldest one in naval service: the ship will be competently manned, competently maintained, and competently conned while they sleep, because a sleeping sailor has no other protection than the watch above him and the readiness of the ship around him.

The Navy’s own reviews would establish what that promise was worth in the summer of 2017: watch teams that failed at basic navigation practice, crews worn down by an operational tempo their superiors knew was unsustainable, training and certifications lapsed or waived, and — on Fitzgerald — key navigation billets unfilled and navigation systems broken for months. The sailors in the berthing compartments had done nothing to earn the risk that reached them. It was delivered by two collisions the Navy itself classified as preventable.

What happened

At about 1:30 a.m. on June 17, 2017, in the sea lanes off the Izu Peninsula of Japan, the Philippine-flagged container ship ACX Crystal struck USS Fitzgerald on her starboard side. The merchant ship’s bow tore into the destroyer at and below the waterline, flooding berthing compartments where sailors were asleep. Fitzgerald’s commanding officer, Cmdr. Bryce Benson, was injured in his cabin, which took the impact. Seven sailors drowned. The ship survived and was carried back to the United States for repairs that took years.

Sixty-four days later, at about 5:24 a.m. on August 21, 2017, in the Strait of Malacca approaches near Singapore, the Liberian-flagged tanker Alnic MC struck USS John S. McCain on her port side. In the minutes before the collision, McCain’s crew had struggled with the ship’s steering — the Navy’s review found that the bridge team had insufficient knowledge and proficiency with the steering system and its modes, and that control of the ship was lost and regained in confusion as the tanker approached. The impact flooded berthing and other compartments. Ten sailors drowned.

Seventeen sailors were dead in nine weeks, none in combat, all in the berthing spaces or working spaces of two warships that had failed to stay clear of two large, visible merchant vessels in open water. The Navy did not hide behind the merchant ships. Its finding, delivered by the Chief of Naval Operations himself, was that both collisions were avoidable — and that the failures were the Navy’s.

What the institution did afterward

On November 2, 2017, Chief of Naval Operations Adm. John Richardson released the findings of the Navy’s Comprehensive Review of the two collisions, completed October 26, 2017, alongside a broader Strategic Readiness Review. Richardson’s words were blunt: both collisions were avoidable, and both were caused in part by failures within the Navy. The review’s catalogue, as the Navy summarized it, included:

The two reviews together produced 111 recommendations on training, readiness, manning, and operational tempo across the surface fleet.

Behind that public review sat a second Fitzgerald investigation the public was not permitted to read: the “dual-purpose” investigation led by Rear Adm. Brian Fort, submitted just 41 days after the Fitzgerald collision. It was withheld under legal privilege. Its contents became public only when Navy Times published them on January 14, 2019 — and only after Pentagon officials had first briefed the Fitzgerald families on what it contained. What it documented was worse than the public review’s abstractions:

Then came accountability, in the form the institution chose. Both commanding officers were charged with offenses including negligent homicide.

For Cmdr. Alfredo J. Sanchez of John S. McCain, the negligent-homicide charge was dropped in May 2018; he pleaded guilty under a plea agreement to a single dereliction-of-duty charge.

For Cmdr. Bryce Benson of Fitzgerald, the negligent-homicide charge was dropped in June 2018, and in April 2019 the Navy withdrew and dismissed all remaining charges. In their place, on April 11, 2019, the Secretary of the Navy issued Secretarial Letters of Censure to Benson and to Lt. Natalie Combs, an officer of the deck in Fitzgerald’s chain that night. Benson was later permitted to retire as a commander, effective December 29, 2019.

Seventeen families were briefed on the Fort investigation’s findings in a closed setting. The document itself remained withheld from the public that pays for the fleet — a two-tier record in which the people with the greatest right to the truth received it privately, and everyone else received the Navy’s summaries.

Where it stands now

The Navy’s institutional verdict stands in its own words: two avoidable collisions, caused by failures to plan, to navigate, to stand watch, and — in the secret report’s sharper language — by a ship sent to sea for two years without a navigation chief, with broken systems cannibalized for parts, under a tempo its own squadron had called unsustainable a year before the collision.

The Navy says it acted on the reviews. By February 2019, Admiral Richardson reported that the Navy had addressed 80 of the 111 recommendations produced by the Comprehensive and Strategic Readiness Reviews. Both ships were repaired and returned to service.

The criminal accountability that the charges once promised does not stand. No commanding officer was convicted of homicide. One pleaded to dereliction after the homicide charge was dropped; the other’s charges were dropped and then dismissed outright, replaced by a letter of censure and an unimpeded retirement at rank. Whatever the legal merits of those outcomes — and the Navy defended them — the distance between the Fort report’s findings and the consequences that followed is a matter of simple arithmetic that the families of seventeen sailors are left to contemplate: a ship unfit in documented ways, a fleet tempo declared unsustainable in writing a year in advance, seventeen dead — and, at the end, letters in two officers’ files.

The seventeen names remain where the Navy’s system put them: on memorials, on the ships that returned to sea without them, and in a full investigative record that the public still cannot read for itself.

The ledger

What was owed

What was paid

What remains open

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