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Richard L. Etchberger: The Medal Withheld 42 Years by a Secret War

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Richard Etchberger was a radar technician, not an infantryman. On March 11, 1968, on a mountaintop in Laos where the United States officially had no combatants at all, he held off an enemy assault alone with an M-16, called in air strikes on his own position, and put three wounded men into rescue slings before he was killed being lifted out himself. His chain of command recommended him for the Medal of Honor. The government that sent him to that mountain could not admit the mountain existed, so it gave him a lesser medal in a closed room, told his family a story that was not true, and kept the truth classified for decades. This page is the documented record.

The service, and the promise

Richard Loy Etchberger was born on March 5, 1933, in Pennsylvania, the younger son of Donald and Catherine Etchberger, and he grew up in the small town of Hamburg, working alongside his father and his older brother Robert in a five-and-dime store. He graduated from Hamburg High School in June 1951 and enlisted in the U.S. Air Force that August, training in electronics and radar bomb scoring. He left the Air Force at the end of his first four-year commitment and re-enlisted ten weeks later. Over the following twelve years he rose rapidly, reaching Chief Master Sergeant — the most senior enlisted rank in the Air Force — after just sixteen years of service. One of his commanders, Brig. Gen. Hal Strack, later described him simply: “one of the best we had, period.”

In the early fall of 1967, Etchberger was one of forty carefully selected men invited to a secret briefing at Barksdale Air Force Base in Louisiana. They were being asked to volunteer for a covert operation nicknamed Project Heavy Green. Its purpose was to turn a clandestine site on top of Phou Pha Thi, one of the highest peaks in Laos, near the border with Vietnam, into a radar station — Lima Site 85 — whose operators would direct bombing raids on North Vietnam in poor visibility. The site became active in early November 1967.

The legal fiction underneath the mission matters to everything that followed. Under the Geneva agreement signed in 1962, Laos was neutral and foreign militaries were barred from its borders. The United States had withdrawn; the North Vietnamese had not, and were moving supplies along the Ho Chi Minh Trail inside Laos. Project Heavy Green proceeded anyway, approved, the Medal of Honor Society records, “by the highest echelons of the American government.” To sustain the denial, the men assigned to the site were separated from the Air Force and, under the direction of the Central Intelligence Agency, officially employed by Lockheed. Provisions were made to re-enlist the men should anything go wrong, so that their families would still receive their military benefits.

That was the promise structure around Richard Etchberger: his skill would be used in secret, and if the worst happened, the paperwork would be repaired so his family was cared for. What it did not provide for was the truth.

What happened

The North Vietnamese knew the site was there almost from the beginning. On January 12, 1968, four North Vietnamese biplanes attacked Phou Pha Thi, and two were shot down by a crew chief firing from an Air America helicopter. Pressure continued, and by March 9 the base of the mountain was completely surrounded by four battalions of North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao forces. The Americans assumed three sides of the sheer rock mountain were unscalable and defended the single path on the fourth side with Hmong fighters. What American intelligence did not know was that North Vietnamese sappers had been training for exactly this assault for two years.

The decision that sealed the site’s fate was made the night before it fell. According to the record assembled by the Medal of Honor Society, at 9 p.m. on March 10, U.S. Ambassador William H. Sullivan — who held ultimate responsibility for the site — decided to evacuate the men the following morning, over the Air Force’s unwillingness to abandon it, the equipment to be destroyed first. The sappers came at 3 a.m., under cover of heavy rocket and artillery fire, up the cliff face the Americans believed no one could climb. There were 19 Americans on the mountain: sixteen men of Project Heavy Green, two CIA officers, and one combat controller.

The men manning the radar were killed almost immediately. Five off-duty team members, Etchberger among them, took shelter on a ledge twenty feet below the summit, over a drop of more than a thousand feet. The sappers followed with handguns and grenades. Two of the five were killed and two wounded. Etchberger, the only one unharmed, was left alone.

What he did next is recorded in his Medal of Honor citation, the government’s own document. Despite having received “little or no combat training” — President Barack Obama, presenting the medal forty-two years later, put it this way: “As a technician, he had no formal combat training. In fact, he had only recently been issued a rifle” — Etchberger single-handedly held off the enemy with an M-16, while simultaneously directing air strikes into the area and calling for air rescue. Hour after hour, grenades were lobbed onto the ledge; the Americans threw them back or kicked them into the valley below. Etchberger called air strikes within yards of his own position, and his defense denied the enemy access to the ledge and kept his remaining crew alive until, in the morning light, a rescue helicopter arrived.

Then, the citation records, “without hesitation,” he “repeatedly and deliberately risked his own life, exposing himself to heavy enemy fire in order to place three surviving wounded comrades into rescue slings hanging from the hovering helicopter.” A fourth airman, who had eluded the enemy all night, rushed forward and was loaded as well. Only when his remaining crew was safely aboard did Etchberger climb into an evacuation sling himself. As he was being raised into the aircraft, he was fatally wounded by enemy ground fire. By the time the helicopter landed at the nearest base, he was gone.

Of the 19 men on the mountain that night, 7 survived. Three of them owed their lives directly to Richard Etchberger.

Later on March 11, Ambassador Sullivan cabled Secretary of State Dean Rusk, in words preserved in the record: “It appears we may have pushed our luck one day too long in attempting to keep this facility in operation.”

What the institution did afterward

Etchberger’s chain of command recommended him for the Medal of Honor. The recommendation did not survive the classification of his mission. The Medal of Honor Society’s account states the reason plainly: because of the classified nature of the mission, and the publicity that attends a Medal of Honor, the award was downgraded. In January 1969, the Air Force Cross — the Air Force’s highest decoration, and the second-highest award for valor — was presented to his widow in a secret ceremony by Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. John P. McConnell. President Obama’s 2010 account adds the family’s side of that room: the widow and sons were escorted to the Pentagon, the boys were told their father was a hero who had died saving his fellow airmen, “but they weren’t told much else.”

The family’s notification of his death had come earlier, and it was false. On March 12, 1968, the Medal of Honor Society records, the family received a telephone call from the Air Force notifying them that he had been killed in a helicopter crash the day before in Thailand. The cover story given to the family is not even consistent across official tellings: the Medal of Honor Society’s account names a helicopter crash in Thailand; the President’s 2010 remarks recount only that the sons were told their father died saving his fellow airmen, with no place or mechanism given; and in the Air Force Magazine account published at the time of the medal, his son Cory recalled being told simply that he had died in a helicopter crash, and that after the American role in Laos was revealed in 1970 the families were told more — but not all — of the details.

His wife learned more, and was bound by it. About nine months after his death, Catherine Etchberger was told the truth about how he had died, and sworn to secrecy. She kept that oath for life. President Obama stated it in 2010: she “had known about Dick’s work all along, but she had been sworn to secrecy. And she kept that promise — to her husband and her country — all those years, not even telling her own sons.” She died in 1994, never having told Steve, Richard, or Cory, and she did not live to see the medal her husband had earned.

The institution’s follow-through failed in smaller ways as well. At the Air Force Cross presentation, Etchberger’s file was supposed to be flagged so that, on declassification, the award would be upgraded to the Medal of Honor. It was not done. Not until 1998 that his name first appeared on the public lists of Air Force Cross recipients — and no mention was made of any upgrade.

The institution had also been warned about the site itself. A study published by the CIA in 1995 records that “the CIA and Air Force analysts had warned of the vulnerability of the site and the Ambassador himself had serious reservations about its advisability,” while strategy still called for operating it “up to the last minute.” Its conclusion on the evacuation that came one morning too late: “the one contingency not considered proved fatal.”

Where it stands now

The mission was declassified in the 1980s. Nearly two decades after their father’s death, the President recounted, the phone rang — the Air Force — and the sons finally learned their father had given his life not in Vietnam, but in Laos, and what he had done on the ledge at Lima Site 85.

Declassification alone did not produce the medal. In 2006, retired Master Sergeant Robert Dilley — an airman who had never known Etchberger but had read of his heroism — wrote to his congressman, and Rep. Earl Pomeroy, joined by Rep. Tim Holden of Pennsylvania, took up the case, backed by Etchberger’s team leader and the Heavy Green commander. Because the statutory time limit for a Medal of Honor had long expired, Congress waived the time limit in 2009. On September 21, 2010 — forty-two years after the action — President Barack Obama presented the posthumous Medal of Honor to Steve, Richard, and Cory Etchberger at the White House. One of the men his father had saved, John Daniel, was present. The President’s words at the ceremony are the institution’s own closing entry in the file: “Because even though it has been 42 years, it’s never too late to do the right thing.”

The recognition, once unsealed, was complete in form. Air Force bases have honored Etchberger with streets and buildings in his name; at Barksdale, a granite monument’s once-empty space beside his name has been etched “Medal of Honor.” The Medal of Honor Society records him as the most senior enlisted man ever to receive the medal, held today at the Air Force Senior Non-Commissioned Officer Academy at Gunter Annex, Maxwell Air Force Base. The words he wrote home months before his death, quoted by the President at the presentation, are his own account of the assignment: “I hate to be away from home, but I believe in the job. It is the most challenging job I’ll ever have in my life. I love it.”

What the record cannot restore is the interval. Catherine Etchberger carried the truth alone for twenty-six years and died sixteen years before the medal was presented. The sons were grown men before their country told them in public what their father had done.

The ledger

The accounting, in three lines — what the record shows has been done, what it shows has not, and what is still being sought.

What has been done

What has not been done

What is being sought

Sources

Part of Betrayed, Not Forgotten — this site's accounting for the service members and veterans their own institutions failed.

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