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The Tuskegee Airmen: The Experiment That Was Supposed to Fail, and the Salute That Took Sixty-Two Years

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The Tuskegee Airmen were set up to fail, on paper, by their own service. The Army War College studies of the 1920s and 1930s had concluded that Black men were unfit for leadership and incapable of aviation, and the flight program created at Tuskegee in 1941 was born under that verdict — an experiment its designers expected to prove them right. The men who graduated from it destroyed some 260 enemy aircraft, flew more than 15,000 combat sorties, and brought home more than 850 medals. Then they came home to segregated buses, unreturned salutes, and sixty-two years of national silence at the collective level. When the Congressional Gold Medal finally came, on March 29, 2007, a President of the United States rendered them a salute and said, in so many words, that it was an apology. This page is the documented record.

The service, and the promise

In 1941, overruling his own generals, President Franklin D. Roosevelt ordered the creation of an all-Black flight training program. It was built at Tuskegee Army Air Field in Alabama, in the Jim Crow South, because the Army Air Forces would not train Black and white airmen together. Nearly 1,000 Black pilots — 992 by the standard count — graduated from Tuskegee, alongside the thousands of Black navigators, bombardiers, mechanics, and ground crew who made the squadrons fly.

The promise embedded in the program was the ordinary one: perform, and the record will speak. But the airmen carried a second burden white pilots did not. Army War College studies commissioned between 1924 and 1939 — cited in the findings of the very legislation that eventually honored them — had concluded that Blacks were unfit for leadership roles and incapable of aviation. Every mission the Tuskegee Airmen flew was therefore graded twice: once against the enemy, and once against their own Army’s published expectation that they could not do it.

What happened

The record answered the studies. The 99th Fighter Squadron went to North Africa in the spring of 1943 and fought through the Mediterranean; in 1944 it joined the 100th, 301st, and 302nd Fighter Squadrons in the 332nd Fighter Group, flying bomber escort for the Fifteenth Air Force out of Italy as the red-tailed Mustangs bomber crews asked for by name.

The documented totals: 450 Tuskegee pilots served in combat overseas. They flew 1,578 missions and 15,533 sorties between May 1943 and June 9, 1945. They destroyed some 260 enemy aircraft. They sank a German destroyer with machine-gun fire alone. They accumulated more than 850 medals, including some 150 Distinguished Flying Crosses and three Distinguished Unit Citations. Sixty-six Tuskegee airmen were killed in action and 32 were taken prisoner. The escort record of the 332nd — losing dramatically fewer bombers to enemy fighters than the average escort group — became the standard against which the whole experiment was judged, and the experiment’s authors were refuted by their own test.

On March 24, 1945, the 332nd flew the longest escort mission of the Fifteenth Air Force’s war — more than 800 miles each way, Ramitelli to Berlin and back — and destroyed three German Me-262 jet fighters over the capital, earning a Distinguished Unit Citation for the day. Six weeks later the war in Europe was over. The experiment, by its results, had produced one of the finest escort groups in the American air war.

The second war continued at home stations. The Army that sent these men against the Luftwaffe kept them out of white officers’ clubs in the United States. In April 1945, at Freeman Field, Indiana, Black officers of the 477th Bombardment Group — Tuskegee-trained men who had not yet been allowed to deploy — were arrested in waves, 101 of them in all, for entering the white officers’ club or refusing to sign a segregated base regulation. They were officers in the Army of the United States, under arrest in Indiana, in the last month of the war in Europe, for walking into the wrong room. The charges dissolved under legal and public pressure, but the reprimands stayed in the officers’ files — until 1995, fifty years later, when the Air Force reviewed the Freeman Field cases and removed them.

What the institution did afterward

The war ended, and the men came home to the country they had left — which is to say, to Jim Crow entire: segregated transportation, segregated facilities, salutes from white servicemen routinely withheld, and a public memory of the war that had no place in it for Black airmen. The 332nd’s record was a matter of Army documentation. It simply was not told.

Their service did change the institution, eventually, and the airmen’s part in that is documented: the combat record built at Tuskegee was among the evidence before President Harry S. Truman when he ordered the desegregation of the armed forces in 1948. The services integrated. The men who had made the case with their flying were, for the most part, out of uniform and out of the story by then.

What the nation owed them as a group — a collective honor at the level of their collective service — took two more generations. The legislation, sponsored by Senator Carl Levin and Representative Charles Rangel and signed in 2006, states its own findings without flinching: it names the Army War College studies, names the 992 graduates and the 450 who fought, and orders a single gold medal struck “in recognition of their unique military record, which inspired revolutionary reform in the Armed Forces.” Those words were enacted in 2006 — sixty-one years after the war ended.

Where it stands now

The medal was presented on March 29, 2007, in the Rotunda of the United States Capitol. Some 300 surviving airmen, widows, and relatives filled the Rotunda — men in their eighties, many in wheelchairs, and the families of men who had not lived to be thanked. The gold medal itself went to the Smithsonian Institution for display; the airmen and the families received bronze replicas of it — the standard form for a collective award, and also the literal form of this story: one medal, struck for nearly a thousand men, most of whom were dead before it existed.

President George W. Bush spoke, and his words are the institution’s own summary of the debt. He described the white airmen of his father’s generation: “Nobody refused to return their salutes. Nobody expected them to bear the daily humiliations while wearing the uniform of their country.” Then he straightened and saluted the airmen himself: “I would like to offer a gesture to help atone for all the unreturned salutes and unforgivable indignities. And so, on behalf of the office I hold, and a country that honors you, I salute you for the service to the United States of America.” The airmen, including men in wheelchairs, rose and returned it.

Lee Archer, the 332nd’s ace, had a phrase for the wave of late honors that reached the airmen in their old age: he called them “late payment,” arriving after sixty-odd years of unjust ignominy. Standing in the Rotunda that day, surveying the ceremony, he amended it on the spot: “Paid in full.” The country is entitled to take him at his word. It is also required to record what the payment schedule was.

Sixty-two years. That is the interval this page exists to record: between the last combat sortie in June 1945 and the salute in the Rotunda in March 2007. The families who stood in that Rotunda — widows who had outlived their husbands by decades, children who had grown up on a story the country wasn’t telling — are the measure of what the delay cost. The medal is real. So is the arithmetic of who was left to receive it.

The ledger

The accounting, in three lines — what the record shows has been done, what it shows has not, and what is still being sought.

What has been done

What has not been done

What is being sought


Sources

Part of Betrayed, Not Forgotten — this site's accounting for the service members and veterans their own institutions failed.

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