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The 24th Infantry Regiment: Condemned by Its Own Army, Vindicated by Its Own Historians

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This page is not about one soldier. It is about a regiment — some thousands of men — and about a verdict pronounced on all of them at once. The 24th Infantry Regiment, the Buffalo Soldiers of 1869, went to Korea in 1950 as the last segregated all-Black infantry regiment in the United States Army. It went to war with the same deficiencies as every regiment in the hollow Eighth Army of that summer — poor training, worn equipment, dead radios — plus one deficiency no white regiment carried: a system of segregation that staffed it with officers who, in the words of the Army's own historians, treated its soldiers with condescension and used the regiment as a dumping ground. In September 1950 its division commander formally declared it "untrustworthy and incapable of carrying out missions expected of an infantry regiment," and on October 1, 1951, the eighty-two-year-old regiment was disbanded under that sentence. Forty-five years later, the Army's own Center of Military History, after an eight-year study ordered by the Secretary of the Army, published its reversal: the failure had been, in the historians' judgment, at least as much the leadership's as the soldiers'. This page is the documented record of the verdict, the disbanding, and the correction that came too late for nearly everyone it concerned.

The service, and the promise

The 24th Infantry Regiment was organized on November 1, 1869, from the 38th and 41st U.S. Infantry Regiments — the Black regular regiments of the frontier Army, the Buffalo Soldiers. Its enlisted ranks were Black; its officers, with few exceptions across its history, were white. It served through the Indian Wars, the Spanish-American War era, and both world wars’ segregated establishments, and in 1950 it was on occupation duty in Japan with the 25th Infantry Division when North Korea invaded the South.

Executive Order 9981, signed by President Truman in July 1948, had ordered equality of treatment in the armed forces. Two years later, the 24th remained what it had always been: a segregated regiment, officered largely by white men for whom assignment to a Black regiment was, in the Army’s internal culture, no distinction — and, the Army’s own study would later find, frequently a punishment posting. The regiment in Japan was used, in the phrase the Center of Military History’s historians recorded, as “a dumping ground for white officers no other unit would have.”

When the regiment embarked for Korea in July 1950, it carried the whole Eighth Army’s unreadiness: like every American unit rushed from occupation duty, it was undertrained and short. Its own record of deficiency was specific and material — at points in the fighting, some 80 percent of its radios were dead, and its soldiers carried worn Second World War rifles. On top of the common unreadiness it carried the segregated Army’s particular tax: white officers who, in the CMH study’s finding, too often regarded the Black soldiers they commanded with condescension, reflecting “the low expectations the Army as a whole held toward blacks”; Black soldiers who knew it, and who served inside a structure that had decided, in advance, what they were. The promise made to the men of the 24th — the citizen-soldier’s promise, that service would be judged on performance — was thus encumbered before the first shot: they would be judged, uniquely among the regiments in Korea, as a race.

What happened

The regiment’s war began, in the record, with a distinction its judges later preferred to forget: on July 21, 1950, the 24th Infantry retook the town of Yechon, in a sixteen-hour fight the Black press and the Army’s own first reports hailed as the first American ground victory of the Korean War. Congressmen praised the regiment on the floor of the House.

What followed was the general catastrophe of the summer of 1950, in which the Eighth Army — white regiments included — was driven into the Pusan Perimeter in a series of collapses, stands, and retreats. The 24th fought inside that catastrophe at the Pusan Perimeter, and its recorded cost there, in the Army’s own figures, was 267 killed and 796 wounded. Those are the numbers of a regiment that was in the line and bleeding in it. But the perimeter fighting attached to the 24th a narrative that attached to no white regiment in the same condition: straggling and withdrawal, in Black soldiers, were read as racial character, while the identical conduct of white units in the same weeks was read as the fortunes of war. An African American officer serving alongside the regiment, Charles Bussey, later wrote the double standard in one sentence: bugging out by Black troops implied a racial defect; retreat by white troops “was ascribed to other reasons.”

Two of the regiment’s soldiers settled the question of its men’s courage at the level no narrative could reach. Private First Class William Thompson, at Haman on August 6, 1950, manned a machine gun alone to cover his platoon’s withdrawal and was killed at it. Sergeant Cornelius H. Charlton, near Chipo-ri on June 2, 1951, took command of his platoon when its leader fell, led repeated assaults up a defended hill, and was killed doing it. Both men received the Medal of Honor, posthumously — the first Medals of Honor awarded to Black servicemen since the Spanish-American War. An “untrustworthy” regiment produced, in ten months, two of the war’s exemplars of the highest valor the nation recognizes. The regiment’s enlisted men were, individually, capable of anything the Army asks of soldiers. The institution’s quarrel was never really with them, and its own historians would eventually say so.

What the institution did afterward

In late September 1950, Major General William B. Kean, commanding the 25th Infantry Division, formally requested that the Eighth Army disband the 24th Infantry, on the stated ground that it had demonstrated itself “untrustworthy and incapable of carrying out missions expected of an infantry regiment.” The request was not immediately granted — there was no regiment available to take the 24th’s place in the line — and the regiment soldiered on for another year under the sentence, through the Chinese offensives and the Eighth Army’s drive back north in the spring of 1951, in which the Army’s record shows it performing creditably. Kean’s successors relieved officers and tightened discipline; the regiment’s own later commanders concluded that leadership had been the problem and relieved a number of officers — an internal admission, made in 1951, that the regiment’s failures ran uphill.

The disbanding came anyway. On October 1, 1951, the 24th Infantry Regiment — eighty-two years old, its colors carrying the frontier, Cuba, and two world wars of the segregated establishment — was inactivated in Korea, its men dispersed into an integrating Army. The verdict that killed it then entered the official record and hardened: when the Army’s official history of the war’s first year, Roy Appleman’s South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu, appeared in 1961, it publicized Kean’s charges and carried the stigma forward as the Army’s settled account. For thirty-five years, that was the institutional word: the Buffalo Soldiers of Korea were the regiment that failed.

The institution also practiced, inside the regiment’s story, the smaller injustices that mirror the large one. Sergeant Charlton’s family received his Medal of Honor from the Secretary of the Army in 1952 — but Charlton was not offered the Arlington National Cemetery burial routinely afforded Medal of Honor recipients, and he was buried instead in a segregated cemetery — Bryant Cemetery, near Bramwell, West Virginia. Arlington’s position, as its officials later stated it, was that the family was never notified of his eligibility through administrative error; the family maintained, from 1951 forward, that the omission was racial discrimination. Both accounts are printed here because both are in the record and they cannot both be true. What is undisputed is the outcome: a Medal of Honor recipient lay in a segregated graveyard — later, from 1989, in an American Legion cemetery in Beckley — for fifty-seven years, while his medal’s other recipients lay at Arlington as a matter of routine.

And within the regiment, the institution’s discipline fell with a documented asymmetry: as Thurgood Marshall’s NAACP investigation found, some sixty Black soldiers of the 24th were charged with misconduct before the enemy in the war’s first months — Lieutenant Leon A. Gilbert’s capital case among them — while virtually no white soldiers of the regiments that collapsed alongside them faced any such charges. The regiment was being judged twice: once in its commander’s report, and once in its courts-martial.

Where it stands now

The correction, when it came, came from inside the institution and on the institution’s own authority. In 1987, Secretary of the Army John O. Marsh Jr. directed the U.S. Army Center of Military History to make a definitive study of the 24th Infantry in Korea. The study took eight years, drew on the transcripts of three official investigations conducted in 1950–51, and interviewed more than four hundred veterans of the regiment. It was published in 1996 as Black Soldier, White Army, by William T. Bowers, William M. Hammond, and George L. MacGarrigle.

Its findings reversed the verdict of 1950. The regiment went to war, the historians concluded, much as the other regiments of the Eighth Army did — poorly trained, badly equipped, short on experience — and its deficiencies were compounded by segregation itself: officers whose condescension mirrored the Army’s low expectations of Black soldiers; a regiment used as a dumping ground for unwanted officers; chronic stragglers and battlefield failures that the study assigned to a leadership “at least as much at fault” as the men it commanded; and a system whose distrust the soldiers could feel. “What is clear,” the executive summary states, “is that if the 24th went into battle much as the other regiments in the Eighth Army did… it carried baggage none of the others possessed, all the problems of trust and lack of self-confidence that the system of segregation had imposed.” The study did not claim the regiment fought well in every action. It established the thing Kean’s verdict had denied: that the 24th’s record was a record of an ill-led, ill-equipped regiment in a collapsing army — not of a race’s incapacity — and that the men who pronounced it untrustworthy bore, in the Army’s own historians’ judgment, at least half the fault they had assigned.

The correction arrived in 1996 — forty-five years after the disbanding. The men it vindicated were, by then, elderly or dead; General Kean’s verdict had stood as the official word for the whole of their adult lives, and Appleman’s history had taught it to two generations. The regiment itself had been reactivated in 1995, as an integrated unit in Alaska, a year before the study appeared.

Charlton’s case closed later still. After his niece, Zenobia Penn, took up the family’s campaign, Sergeant Cornelius H. Charlton was reinterred at Arlington National Cemetery with full honors on November 12, 2008 — fifty-seven years after his death at Chipo-ri — in a ceremony attended by family, by the last living Buffalo Soldiers, and by living Medal of Honor recipients. He is, the record notes, the only Black Korean War Medal of Honor recipient buried at Arlington. The family’s account of why he was not there in 1951 and the cemetery’s account of administrative error remain unreconciled in the record; the grave, at last, is where the medal always said it should be.

The ledger

The accounting, in three lines — what the record shows has been done, what it shows has not, and what is still being sought.

What has been done

What has not been done

What is being sought

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